This volume tackles contemporary problems of legal accommodation of diversity in Europe and recent developments in the area in diverse European legal regimes. Despite professing the motto 'Unity in Diversity,' Europe appears to be struggling with discord rather than unity. Legal discussions reflect a crisis when it comes to matters of migration, accommodation of minorities, and dealing with the growing heterogeneity of European societies. The book illustrates that the current legal conundrums stem from European oscillation between, on the one hand, acknowledging the need of accommodation, and, on the other, the tendencies to preserve existing legal traditions. It claims that these opposite tendencies have led Europe to the edge of pluralism. This 'edge' - just as with the linguistic interpretation of the word 'edge' - carries multiple meanings, conveying a plethora of problems encountered by law when dealing with diversity. The book explores and illustrates these multiple 'edges of pluralism,' tracing back their origins and examining the contemporary legal conundrums they have led to.

The second edition of this book, which is the first major text in the field directed to both legal practitioners and law students, contains a detailed analysis of Australian anti-discrimination law as well as extracts from all of the major cases and the writings of leading commentators. It incorporates the many changes to the law since the first edition was published in 2008 and includes new chapters dealing with positive duties, victimisation and protections against discrimination in industrial relations laws. The book includes a comprehensive examination of the difficult concepts of direct and indirect discrimination as well as coverage of the major grounds of unlawful discrimination, such as race, sex and disability. The book records the history of the major pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, examines important international developments and includes numerous suggestions for reform.

Since the Australian High Court was established in 1903, ceremonies have been held to mark the swearing-in of a new Justice. This chapter utilizes the speeches made at the swearing-in ceremonies of Gaudron, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell as a prism to explore the representation of women judges in the Australian legal community, and in particular, the Australian High Court.

These ceremonies are a rich resource by virtue of the two kinds of speeches made on these occasions. First, leaders of the Australian legal community make speeches welcoming the new High Court judge to the bench. In a legal system where federal judges are chosen behind closed doors, the welcome speeches have performed a key role in introducing the new judges to the public, and attesting to their skills as lawyer and judge. Importantly, the litany of a new judge’s accomplishments on these occasions contextualizes the concept of “merit” in a High Court appointment. Furthermore, the speech by the Commonwealth Attorney-General has provided a measure of public justification of his decision to appoint a particular judge. This chapter explores how the welcome speakers have grappled with the novelty of the feminine in the stories about the four female High Court judges. I argue that gender too often dominated this narrative, to a discriminatory and feminizing effect. In this regard, however, Bell’s ceremony may signal a new direction in the Australian legal community’s attitude toward female judges.

The second element of the swearing-in ceremony is the judge’s response to the welcome speeches. As his or her inaugural speech as a member of the High Court, this speech is the judicial equivalent of the “maiden speech” by members of parliament. The judge’s speech is delivered in a setting rich with contradiction: a statement from the bench, yet of no judicial force; liberated in content and style from the boundaries of a legal dispute and yet constrained by the weight of convention regarding the “appropriate” remarks for an incoming judge; and, a statement of individual identity, values, and principles made from the “identity-less” judge of the common law tradition. For present purposes, the critical feature of the inaugural speeches of Australia’s four female High Court judges is how they tell their stories and the place of gender in that narrative. I argue that these speeches reflect a continuing pressure faced by women judges to distance themselves from the perception of their “otherness” on the bench. This pressure manifested first in Gaudron’s speech, Women Judges, “Maiden Speeches,” and the High Court of Australia when she tempered her bold acknowledgment of her identity as the first woman to join the High Court with affirmations of her sameness with her brother judges. Significantly, twenty years later, Bell’s swearing-in speech continued to display both a self-conscious silencing of her feminine voice and statements affirming her distance from outsiders on the bench.

During the High Court of Australia’s first century, Mary Gaudron served as the first and only female member of its bench. This paper commemorates the 25th anniversary of Gaudron’s appointment to the High Court by examining the speeches made at her swearing-in ceremony, in February 1987. Largely ignored by scholars, swearing-in ceremonies provide unique insights into the history of courts and the personality and philosophy of their judges. Through the prism of Gaudron’s swearing-in ceremony, this paper showcases the significance of these occasions as a commentary on the institutional and intellectual life of the Court. In particular, Gaudron’s swearing-in ceremony tells a fascinating story of institutional and gender politics in the High Court: the legal community’s varied response to the novelty of a woman High Court Justice; Gaudron’s intricate balancing between her distinctive vision of her obligations as a mentor to women lawyers and her role as ‘one of seven’ on a collegiate bench; and the perennial tension between innovation and tradition in legal method.

Written by highly qualified authors, the direct, clear and often humorous style of this book will help readers understand how the law relates to real issues and controversies. The institutions and sources of law in our legal system are clearly explained, including the roles of lawyers, the courts and the legislature. Illustrative examples and a discussion of actual cases enable students and other citizens to engage with topics such as historical basis of Australian law, Australian law and international law, human rights, procedural fairness and the notions of law and morality. New stimulus questions and activities included in this 8th edition invite the reader to consider the interrelationship of law, tradition and social values. Understanding Law is a perfect introduction to the law for students engaging with legal studies and for other academic disciplines at tertiary and senior secondary levels. It is an ideal starting point for any Australian interested in learning more about their legal system.

Citizenship is a prime site for comparison between different constitutional systems, for the idea of citizenship, and the ideals it is taken to represent, go to the heart of how states are constituted and defined. Who is governed by the constitution? What are the boundaries of the constitution? The definition of the class of 'citizens' of a state and the identification of their rights, privileges and responsibilities is one way to answer these questions, and is a core function of national constitutions and a central concern of public law. In this chapter, we consider several written constitutions and attempt to convey some of the diversity in constitutional approaches to this fundamental and universal project for nation states.

Sir William Deane was a member of the High Court of Australia during one of its most creative periods, from 1982 to 1995. His decisions displayed a notable commitment to social justice and a willingness to extend the constitutional protection of human rights. These tendencies were particularly prominent during the Mason Court years (1987-1995), manifesting in decisions including Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455; and the political communication cases of 1992 and 1994. Although his judgments displayed a clear vision of his judicial responsibilities, Deane adopted a strict extra-judicial silence regarding the principles that informed his judicial philosophy. However, as Australia's 22nd Governor-General Deane was more open regarding his personal beliefs and their influence on his performance of those duties. This article utilises Deane's public statements as Governor-General to shed light on the foundations of his judicial philosophy. In particular, as Governor-General Deane drew on his Christian faith to support his commitment to highlight the cause of indigenous reconciliation and the plight of the disadvantaged in Australia. This article argues that Deane's spiritual convictions, as articulated in his vice-regal statements, can also be regarded as underpinning his understanding of his role as High Court Justice.

Although efforts have been made to develop international or harmonised regimes for the enforcement of securities law, the global architecture of securities regulation is underdeveloped. In particular, the harmonisation project may be sidelined by nations enforcing their securities laws extraterritorially. Notwithstanding issues of comity, the extraterritorial operation of the anti-fraud provisions in United States securities law has been expansively interpreted by US courts, particularly in multinational securities class actions, and the US has accordingly been portrayed as a securities policeman or, more disparagingly, a legal imperialist. This ended abruptly with the US Supreme Court decision in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, where it was held that the anti-fraud provisions did not apply in an action brought by an Australian investor against an Australian company listed on an Australian exchange. This case note will examine the context and consequences of Morrison, including the legislation passed by Congress in its wake, the tensions caused if US citizens lose the ‘protective shield’ of US law and the centrifugal effect of the decision that may lead to more securities class actions being commenced in Australia.

This paper arises out of a concern for the future of feminist legal scholarship in the academy. First, it considers the significance of the implosion of the category ‘woman’, suggesting that it should be understood in its particular epistemic context. Secondly, it considers the impact of the contemporary market paradigm on feminist legal scholarship and on feminist academics generally. As the prognosis is not optimistic, the paper poses the question as to whether the more appropriate site for feminist legal academics might be outside the academy.