This paper evaluates the provisions concerning constructive trusteeship in Trusts Act 1994 (Marshall Islands) and makes more general observations about the roles of constructive trusts in litigation involving trustees' breaches of duty, the roles of statute law and the risk inherent in attempts to express complex and multi-faceted private law concepts in statutory formulae.

This paper examines the growth of transnational governance, and what it means for business lawyers advising multinational corporate clients. The term “governance” incorporates the network of actors, instruments and mechanisms that now govern transnational corporations, separate from the nation state. It is reasonable to expect that lawyers play an important role in advising business clients on how to effectively operate within this system. Indeed, many transnational legal instruments are intended to enhance clients’ business goals by enabling them to engage more efficiently in cross-border commerce. Other forms of regulation, such as human rights regulation, purports to impose requirements on companies that go beyond what is necessary to enhance cross-border commerce.

In this paper we discuss the transnational governance regime that has arisen to address the adverse human rights impacts of business activities. We focus in particular on the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. We ask what if any role is there for lawyers in fostering acknowledgment and fulfilment of these responsibilities among clients? Is the duty to respect human rights a “legal” obligation in any sense? If a lawyer does provide advice, should it encompass only legal risks to the company that fall within the lawyer’s traditionally defined specialized expertise? Or should it go beyond that to include other concerns?

The recognition and enforcement of legitimate expectations by courts has been a striking feature of English law since R v North and East Devon Health Authority; ex parte Coughlan [2001] 3 QB 213. Although the substantive form of legitimate expectation adopted in Coughlan was quickly accepted by English courts and received a generally favourable response from public law scholars, the doctrine of that case has largely been rejected in other common law jurisdictions. The central principles of Coughlan have been rejected by courts in common law jurisdictions outside the UK for a range of reasons, such as incompatibility with local constitutional doctrine, or because they mark an undesirable drift towards merits review. The skeptical and critical reception to Coughlan outside England is a striking contrast to the reception the case received within the UK. This issue warrants the detailed scholarly analysis that it receives in this forthcoming book to be published by Hart.

This chapter considers the promises public authorities make to individuals and how they are received. It examines both the capacity of government to create expectations and the legitimacy of people entertaining firm expectations of government and considers the substantive enforcement of legitimate expectations, when government might be estopped from resiling from its representations and in what circumstances government may be liable for making negligent misrepresentations.

Human rights and their principles of interpretation are the leading legal paradigms of our time. Freedom of religion occupies a pivotal position in rights discourses, and the principles supporting its interpretation receive increasing attention from courts and legislative bodies. This book critically evaluates religious pluralism as an emerging legal principle arising from attempts to define the boundaries of  freedom of religion. It examines religious pluralism as an underlying aspect of different human rights regimes and constitutional traditions.

Laws have colonised most of the corners of political practice, and now substantially determine the process and even the product of democracy. Yet analysis of these laws of politics has been hobbled by a limited set of theories about politics. Largely absent is the perspective of deliberative democracy – a rising theme in political studies that seeks a more rational, cooperative, informed, and truly democratic politics. Legal and political scholarship often view each other in reductive terms. This book breaks through such caricatures to provide the first full-length examination of whether and how the law of politics can match deliberative democratic ideals.

Citizenship is the pivotal legal status in any nation-state. In Australia, the democratic, social and political framework, and its identity as a nation, is shaped by the notion of citizenship. Australian Citizenship Law sheds light on citizenship law and practice and provides the most up-to-date analysis available of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).

Rubenstein’s Australian Citizenship Law is the much-awaited second edition to her highly acclaimed text. It has been cited in High Court decisions, referred to in national and international academic work and used extensively by practitioners working in citizenship law, migration law, constitutional and administrative law and is an essential resource for migration agents.

Moreover, because of its broader analysis, it is crucially relevant to any discipline associated with citizenship, including, history, politics, education or sociology, and to government officials working in the area of citizenship, especially those working in our embassies and consulates.

This book considers the concepts underlying our Constitution and explores constitutional decision-making in context. It reviews all of the important constitutional decisions of the High Court of Australia, and exposes the issues that arise in those decisions to a critical analysis. The book covers all major areas of study in both constitutional law and public law.

Updates for this edition include the two Williams cases in which the High Court reworked the executive power of the Commonwealth to contract and spend; recent cases developing the Kable principles and considering the validity of State laws against Chapter III implications; important recent cases on the implied freedom of political communication; recent cases on s 92 of the Constitution dealing with internet trade and commerce.

In March 2009, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and several other deposed judges were restored to the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a result of a populist movement for the restoration of an independent judiciary. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has since engaged in judicial activism that has resulted in a clash between the judiciary and the elected executive and has brought the distinction between the Rule of Law and the judicialization of politics into contestation. This Paper deconstructs the philosophical debates over the meaning and relevance of the Rule of Law in order to show that the claims to universal applicability, neutrality and inherent value implicit in the dominant modes of theorizing about the Rule of Law are hollow. The deeper concern animating these debates is not the desire to draw hard lines between “law” and “politics.” However, abstract Rule of Law contestations have limited value and relevance, when divorced from the political, constitutional, and sociological context. Only a sharper understanding of the nature of the special politics of law and the specific contexts (of constitutional law, state structure, social, and economic life- forms) shall enable a better understanding of the ever-increasing resonance of the Rule of Law, especially in the Global South.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan underwent a remarkable transformation in its institutional role and constitutional position during the tenure of the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iflikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (2005-2013). This era in Pakistan's judicial history was also marked by great controversy as the court faced charges that it had engaged in "judicial activism," acted politically, and violated the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between institutions of the state. This article presents an in-depth analysis of the judicial review actions of the Chaudhry Court and argues that the charge of judicial activism is theoretically unsound and analytically obfuscating. The notion of judicial activism is premised on the existence of artificial distinctions between law, politics and policy and fails to provide a framework for adequately analyzing or evaluating the kind of judicial politics Pakistan has recently experienced. The Supreme Court's role, like that of any apex court with constitutional and administrative law jurisdiction, has always been deeply and structurally political and will continue to be so in the future. As such, this article focuses on the nature and consequences of the Chaudhry Court's judicial politics rather than addressing the issue of whether it indulged in politics at all. It analyzes the underlying causes that enabled the court to exercise an expanded judicial function and in doing so engages with the literature on the "judicialization of politics" around the world.