Professor Donald Butler has written a short paper explaining what chewed shrubs actually tell us about forest regeneration.

The Clean Energy Regulator has recently published several graphs, including Figure ES1 below, in response to concerns over the underperformance of human-induced regeneration (HIR) projects in regenerating native forests. Figure ES1 purports to show trends in woody cover (forest cover, or possibly forest and sparse woody cover combined) over the period 1988 to 2020 in the carbon estimation areas (CEAs) of projects whose project commencement dates were backdated to between 2010-11 and 2012-13, relative to the trends in the CEAs of projects that commenced over the period 2014-16 and an unspecified local government area (LGA).

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is now the world’s largest infrastructure initiative, with long-term climate change effects, and the Green Investment Principles for Belt and Road (GIPs) have been promoted as a key instrument to green the Belt and Road. This article focuses on the question: What role do the GIPs play in building a green Belt and Road and addressing relevant regulatory challenges? Based on the theory of nodal governance, it is argued that the GIPs’ two-layered networks facilitate China to influence investment decisions over many countries along the Belt and Road indirectly through fund providers as key nodes to transition toward green investment. China also avoided direct interference with the domestic policies of host countries through the GIP network. As a framework agreement, the GIPs also provide opportunities for signatories to contribute to the design and negotiation of specific implementation standards, enhanced capacity building, and the prospect of more stringent and prescriptive environmental standards in the future.

Under the Albanese Government’s climate policy, the Safeguard Mechanism is intended to be the primary mechanism for reducing Australia’s emissions and achieving its climate change mitigation targets (43% reduction by 2030 and net zero by 2050). To do this, the Government is making changes to the Safeguard Mechanism to convert it from a regulatory instrument that was originally designed to constrain emission increases into an emissions trading scheme that drives down emissions. Under the enhanced Safeguard Mechanisms, covered facilities will be subject to emission caps based on the emissions-intensity of their operations that will decline over time. These facilities will be able to meet their emission caps (called baselines) by cutting onsite emissions or buying and surrendering either ‘Safeguard Mechanism Credits’ (a form of emission permit issued to covered facilities if their emissions are below their caps) or Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs).

What private law avenues are open to victims of human rights violations? This innovative new collection explores this question across sixteen jurisdictions in the Global South and Global North. It examines existing mechanisms in domestic law for bringing civil claims in relation to the involvement of states, corporations and individuals in specific categories of human rights violation: (i) assault or unlawful arrest and detention of persons; (ii) environmental harm; and (iii) harmful or unfair labour conditions. Taking a truly global perspective, it assesses the question in jurisdictions as diverse as Kenya, Switzerland, the US and the Philippines. A much needed and important new statement on how to respond to human rights violations. 

Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) have each witnessed a ‘punitive turn’ in relation to youth justice responses. A lack of contextualisation, such as the impact of trauma and adverse childhood experiences on young people, is often overlooked by media outlets, governments and policymakers, in favour of individual pathologisation of young people. In direct contrast to these punitive responses, the public health approach (PHA) has emerged particularly in the UK; and it identifies experiences of trauma as one of the leading causes of violence within communities. Drawing on the perspectives of those working with children and young people, we critically explore whether the implementation of a PHA could be an effective approach to addressing the underlying causes of young people's involvement in violence. The paper focuses specifically on a case study of the youth justice system in Victoria, Australia and draws on domestic and global perspectives of key stakeholders, to consider whether the introduction of a PHA in Victoria, Australia, would position young people's diverse needs at the centre of policy change in youth justice and better outcomes for young people and communities.

This article submits that the Philippines’ withdrawal from the ICC is invalid under municipal law and ineffective under international law. Notwithstanding the silence of the Philippine Constitution, the principles embodied under it do not allow for a unilateral executive withdrawal from the Statute. Nothing under the president’s plenary executive or foreign affairs power allows him to perform such an act. Moreover, the doctrines of transformation, separation of powers, and the principle of checks and balances require a concurrent legislative act in denouncing a treaty. The withdrawal being invalid under municipal law, it arguably produces no effect under international law. While the regime governing the law of treaties is silent as to the effect of domestic law concerning the competence of a state organ to withdraw, there exists ample authority to suggest that fundamental violations under the latter invalidate the competence to denounce treaties under the former.

There is a broad political consensus that states must not facilitate money laundering, especially as relates to the proceeds of foreign grand corruption. Over the past 30 years, an elaborate regulatory regime has been put in place in most countries to ensure that proceeds of crime are interdicted and confiscated. It rests on the technically non-binding recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, an influential intergovernmental grouping. Despite this progress and the adoption of international treaties against corruption and organized crime, international law contains no express treaty rule that enjoins states from facilitating money laundering. Furthermore, there are formidable legal and practical obstacles to invoking international legal responsibility of states that do choose to benefit from enabling money laundering. This article explores the disconnect between international law as it stands and the widely accepted political imperative that states must not facilitate money laundering. It argues in favour of recognizing a self-standing customary rule to that effect, and outlines the content and likely impact of such a rule.

A growing number of incidents—particularly since 2009—highlight the South China Sea (SCS) as the preeminent venue for the People's Republic of China (PRC) maritime gray zone operations. “Gray zone operations” are, in essence, operations that are designed to exploit or create legal (and other) uncertainties for a military or strategic advantage. A prominent example is the way that China has used the so-called nine(ten)-dash line without fully explaining the legal basis for it. There are other examples, as well. China has deliberately cultivated uncertainty about the sovereign status of maritime militia vessels—and thus about whether and how the conduct of these vessels might be directly attributable to the PRC. It has harassed U.S. survey vessels seventy-five nautical miles (nm) south of Hainan Island in an effort to disrupt military survey operations that it claims are impermissible and has sunk a Philippine fishing vessel at Reed Bank in an effort to enforce Chinese claims to exclusive fisheries rights in this area. It has also asserted claims and enforcement rights in zones that clearly belong to other states—including actions against Indonesian fishing vessels in seas in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, which are part of the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (and Continental Shelf). And it has conducted operations on the basis of inapplicable maritime zone rights, such as by asserting a territorial sea and thus the right to control innocent passage around low-tide elevations with artificial installations built upon them—such as with Mischief Reef. The list goes on.