The Clean Energy Regulator has recently published several graphs, including Figure ES1 below, in response to concerns over the underperformance of human-induced regeneration (HIR) projects in regenerating native forests. Figure ES1 purports to show trends in woody cover (forest cover, or possibly forest and sparse woody cover combined) over the period 1988 to 2020 in the carbon estimation areas (CEAs) of projects whose project commencement dates were backdated to between 2010-11 and 2012-13, relative to the trends in the CEAs of projects that commenced over the period 2014-16 and an unspecified local government area (LGA).

Carbon offsets can play a critical role in climate policy by reducing the economy-wide costs of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and generating important social and environmental cobenefits. However, the benefits of offsets are contingent on integrity – the offsets must represent real and additional greenhouse gas abatement. There are serious integrity issues with Australia’s carbon offset scheme. Weak governance structures have resulted in deficiencies in the design and administration of the scheme. The problems with the scheme have been detailed in a series of papers published by the Australian National University (ANU) and University of New South Wales, Canberra (UNSW) Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) research team and other groups.

The Emissions Reduction Fund’s (ERF) Human-induced Regeneration (HIR) method provides landholders with Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs) for regenerating native forests by changing land management practices. When it was originally made, the method was intended to incentivise the regeneration of native forests by allowing juvenile trees and shrubs to regrow in areas that were previously cleared. Offset projects involving the regeneration of native forests that would not have regenerated in the absence of the project, such as in previously cleared areas, are both legitimate and desirable. However, the vast majority of HIR projects are not in areas that have previously been cleared. Almost all of the current HIR projects are located in semi-arid and arid areas (less than 350 mm average annual rainfall) that have never been comprehensively cleared (Figure 1), meaning most proponents are trying to regenerate native forests in remnant native vegetation solely by reducing grazing pressure from livestock and feral animals

Earlier this year, we went public with details of serious integrity issues in Australia’s carbon market, which forms part of the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF). One of our main concerns is with a carbon offset method known as Human-Induced Regeneration of a Permanent Even-Aged Native Forest (HIR). Our analysis suggests most of the credits issued under this method are not backed by real and additional carbon storage.

Since 2014, the centrepiece of Australia’s climate policy has been the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), a $4.5 billion fund that incentivises emissions reduction activities across the economy and forms the basis of Australia’s carbon market. Under the ERF, projects that reduce emissions receive credits that can be sold to the Australian Government and private entities that are required to, or that voluntarily choose to, offset their emissions.

Earlier this year, we went public with details of serious integrity issues with the ERF, labelling it ‘environmental and taxpayer fraud’. While a number of long-held concerns with the scheme exist, we have initially focused on the ERF’s most popular carbon credit methods: human-induced regeneration (HIR); avoided deforestation; and landfill gas. Our analysis suggests up to 80% of the carbon credits issued to projects under these methods lack integrity. That is, they do not represent real (emissions have not been reduced) or additional (the reduction would have happened anyway) abatement.

The Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) is the centre-piece of the Australian Government’s climate policy. It was first introduced in 2014 and is comprised of three main elements: a carbon offset crediting scheme, which issues Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs) to projects that abate emissions; a purchasing scheme, whereby the Clean Energy Regulator (on behalf of the Australian Government) voluntarily purchases ACCUs from eligible offset projects; and the ‘Safeguard Mechanism’, which imposes emission obligations on designated large facilities that can be met through the relinquishment of ACCUs. 

The available data provide compelling evidence that the majority of the abatement credited under the Emissions Reduction Fund’s (ERF) landfill gas methods has not been additional. It appears that in the order of two-thirds of the abatement credited under the methods would have occurred in the absence of the incentive provided by the issuance of ACCUs. The non-additional abatement credited under these methods equates to approximately 19.5 million Australian carbon credit units (ACCUs), or almost 20% of the total number of ACCUs issued under the ERF to the end of 2021. These credits are likely to have been worth more than $300 million.

Major developments have the potential to generate significant economic benefit and substantial environmental damage – and major political controversies as local, State and federal governments become involved. Process can fracture all too easily as governments come under fierce and competing pressures. This book is concerned with whether environmental impact assessment is an effective vehicle for protecting the Australian environment when major projects are in play. It scrutinises a major development in each State and territory and shows what happened and why things happened, which processes worked and which didn’t, and the roles of the different layers of government. The case studies include the headline projects such as the Gunns Mill in the Tamar Valley, Queensland’s Traveston Dam, the dredging of Port Phillip Bay, the expansion of the McArthur River mine and the Gorgon Gas development of Barrow Island.

This article provides a critique of a paper by Gerard Early on the operation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act). Early’s article presents the EPBC Act as world best practice environmental impact assessment (EIA) legislation and argues that it has produced significant improvements in environmental outcomes. The evidence suggests otherwise. The EPBC Act is deficient in a number of respects, particularly in relation to the structure of the EIA regime and listing processes concerning threatened biodiversity and heritage areas. This article outlines defects in Early’s analysis and in the EPBC Act more generally.