When evaluating the success of environmental conflict resolution (ECR), the use of traditional measures of success, such as agreement counting and participant satisfaction surveys provide an incomplete picture. This article proposes two measures to evaluate ECR in terms of both process and outcome: Is the process transformative of the participants? Is the process designed to be attentive to environmental outcomes?

This paper considers how recent changes in higher education are impacting on the discipline of law, causing the critical scholarly space to contract in favour of that which is market-based and applied. The charging of high fees has transformed the delicate relationship between student and teacher into one of "customer" and "service provider". Changes in pedagogy, modes of delivery and assessment have all contributed to the narrowing of the curriculum in a way that supports the market. The paper will briefly illustrate the way the transformation has occurred and consider its effect on legal education and the legal academy.

This valedictory address presents an account of an experiment to set up a Department of Law and Legal Studies within a School of Social Sciences, at La Trobe University in Melbourne, with the aim of emphasising not just the role of law in its social context, but an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law. As with the attempts by the legal realists at Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s, the experiment was unsuccessful. In light of the evanescence of the vision, the question arose as to whether external political pressures, including the corporatisation of universities and the commodification of higher education, were responsible for inducing significant changes of direction or whether law is inherently resistant to the social.

A nationwide movement to reform jury trial practice is underway. At the core of these reforms is an effort to make the courtroom more like a classroom. The current wave of jury reform is designed to take advantage of learning theory that shows that "active learners" remember and comprehend new information better than passive learners. Reforms in jury trial practice now being proposed across the country will allow jurors to take a more active role in the trial, to become "active learners" by allowing them to take notes, ask questions, discuss the evidence with each other, keep notebooks with exhibits and jury instructions, and more. The current wave of jury reform also gives attorneys more opportunities to address the jury and more opportunities to explain the merits of their case. The goal of the reforms is to improve jury comprehension and motivate the jurors to stay awake and attentive.

In general, reforms that treat the courtroom more like a classroom favor the lawyers who are the better teachers. Most trial lawyers already consider themselves to be good teachers. The "active learning" jury should motivate trial lawyers to pick up the chalk and plan to teach even more. Although students/jurors feel more empowered in an active learning environment, it is the person who has something to teach who is most empowered. The teacher is empowered because he or she has an audience that is attentive and better equipped with the tools to learn. The teacher/lawyer will see the reforms as new opportunities to reach into the jurors' minds. The skilled teacher/lawyer will guide note taking, provide excellent written materials for the juror notebooks, and use juror questions to gain insight about how the jurors' view the evidence. In other words, reforms designed to improve juror comprehension will, in the hands of a skilled teacher, give the trial lawyer more and better opportunities to teach and persuade the jury of the justice of their cause.

This short article will give you an overview of recent jury reform initiatives and provide some preliminary thoughts about how trial lawyers can make the most of the coming jury trial practice reforms.

Although Brown v. Board of Education set the stage for the civil rights movement and ended an era of strict racial segregation in schooling, it did not deliver all of the expected educational benefits for black children. Fifty years after the Supreme Court declared an end to the separate but equal doctrine in public schools, America's schools are still substantially segregated and unequal. It is safe to say that the educational results of Brown have been a disappointing. In this article, I contend that much of the disappointment of Brown stems from a misconception of the power of schooling and a disconnect between America's faith in its schools and their operational reality.

So much was expected from Brown because many believed, or at least hoped, that ending segregation in schools would - in itself - make inroads into the structure of a racially oppressive society. Implicit in the Brown decision and in the litigation leading to Brown is an unexamined faith in the institution of public schooling and its power to effect social change. That faith encompasses the beliefs that public schools are capable of serving as the social balance wheel for a capitalist society; that they create citizen affinity; and that they operate as engines of societal reform. Each of these beliefs is contestable and worthy of examination. This article examines Brown as an expression of faith in public schooling and considers its power to be a democratizing force in American society. It then puts that faith in the context of the public school's discriminatory history. I go on to consider two ways in which schooling was expected to accomplish its democratizing effect - by establishing equality and by creating racial affinity - and explain reasons to doubt that the schools alone can ever accomplish these goals. Finally, I conclude that fifty years of experience with Brown require us to take a new look at the social framework for achieving equality and social cohesion. Given the limits of the power of schooling to effect social change, we cannot simply reform schools and expect resulting social and political changes. Instead, we must strive for greater equality and cohesion in society if we hope to achieve equal opportunity in schooling. School reform cannot take place in the absence of supporting social reform.

Using Ohio's experience with court-ordered mediation in school finance litigation as a point of departure, this article examines the potential for court-ordered mediation to provide procedural justice in the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. The article begins by sketching out some of the difficulties that courts encounter when designing a remedy in a school finance case and some of the reasons why, at least in the abstract, a mediation process may assist the parties and the court. Next, the article provides a brief history of the DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E. 2d 1113 (Ohio 2001), placing the abstract remedial concepts against the concrete details of a particular case. It then explores some possible reasons for the failure of the DeRolph mediation and suggests what might have been done to create a better possibility for success.

In spite of the failure of the DeRolph mediation, this article suggests that mediation may play a productive role in the future of school finance cases. Court-ordered mediation may permit the re-structuring of the remedial process in a way that addresses minority rights which often are lost or minimized in the traditional legislative process. Further, a participatory mediation process holds promise for achieving remedial results in a school finance case that are both educationally viable and politically sustainable. Mediation may open new avenues for the resolution of litigation at the intersection of private process and public policy.

Several lessons may be drawn from the DeRolph litigation. DeRolph teaches that mediation is more likely to play a positive role in the resolution of an important institutional reform case if it is considered as a primary avenue of achieving remedial results rather than as a very last resort. Further, any court considering whether to order the mediation of an important institutional reform case should be attentive to creating a substantive and procedural framework that will support the parties' motivation and effort to devise their own remedy. This article encourages the court to support court-ordered mediation by providing a clear and unequivocal statement of the rights of the parties and remedial principles that apply in the case and by outlining fall-back remedial procedures that will be implemented if resolution is not achieved. The court should also consider the legitimacy benefit that may accrue from the participation of a broad group of interested constituencies and construct a framework that supports the mediator's efforts to identify and include a broad group of stakeholders.

This article represents an effort to learn from past failure and to plan for future success in school finance mediation and other public law litigation.

Using Ohio's experience with court-ordered mediation in school finance litigation as a point of departure, this article examines the potential for court-ordered mediation to provide procedural justice in the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. The article begins by sketching out some of the difficulties that courts encounter when designing a remedy in a school finance case and some of the reasons why, at least in the abstract, a mediation process may assist the parties and the court. Next, the article provides a brief history of the DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E. 2d 1113 (Ohio 2001), placing the abstract remedial concepts against the concrete details of a particular case. It then explores some possible reasons for the failure of the DeRolph mediation and suggests what might have been done to create a better possibility for success.

In spite of the failure of the DeRolph mediation, this article suggests that mediation may play a productive role in the future of school finance cases. Court-ordered mediation may permit the re-structuring of the remedial process in a way that addresses minority rights which often are lost or minimized in the traditional legislative process. Further, a participatory mediation process holds promise for achieving remedial results in a school finance case that are both educationally viable and politically sustainable. Mediation may open new avenues for the resolution of litigation at the intersection of private process and public policy.

Several lessons may be drawn from the DeRolph litigation. DeRolph teaches that mediation is more likely to play a positive role in the resolution of an important institutional reform case if it is considered as a primary avenue of achieving remedial results rather than as a very last resort. Further, any court considering whether to order the mediation of an important institutional reform case should be attentive to creating a substantive and procedural framework that will support the parties' motivation and effort to devise their own remedy. This article encourages the court to support court-ordered mediation by providing a clear and unequivocal statement of the rights of the parties and remedial principles that apply in the case and by outlining fall-back remedial procedures that will be implemented if resolution is not achieved. The court should also consider the legitimacy benefit that may accrue from the participation of a broad group of interested constituencies and construct a framework that supports the mediator's efforts to identify and include a broad group of stakeholders.

This article represents an effort to learn from past failure and to plan for future success in school finance mediation and other public law litigation.

This paper turns to historical evidence as a beginning point for understanding the constitutional vision and values of the "thorough and efficient system of common schools" mandated by Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. First, it traces the early development of public schooling in America and the complex relationship between public education and religion. The common school, as envisioned by the Ohio crusaders for its establishment, would bring diverse peoples together to create a common sense of citizenship. It would provide for citizen equality, and social and economic mobility; and it would safeguard liberty by developing a polity capable of self-government. The common school vision competed, however, with the existing reality of schools that were tuition-based, locally governed, diverse and sectarian.

Prior to 1851, the conflict over competing visions of schooling - one embraced primarily by protestant school crusaders, the other embraced by the Catholic Church - had escalated into violent conflict in New York City and Boston. In Ohio, conflict relating to the nature of public education, and, more specifically, the use of public money for sectarian schools had not become violent, but had been vigorously debated since 1789. The inclusion of the provision for a "thorough and efficient system of common schools" in the Constitution of 1851 represented a victory for the advocates of a non-sectarian, state-operated system of schools that would encourage civic participation and avoid religious indoctrination.

Next, the paper addresses efforts made to revise the state's educational provisions through constitutional amendments in 1874 and again in 1912. In considering and rejecting various amendments to Article VI, Section 2, the delegates to these conventions reinforced and redefined the non-sectarian ethos of public education. They also added new provisions to centralize authority for the efficient administration of education and to ensure state oversight over a single system of schools.

Finally, the authors attempt to place the constitutional "common school ideal" in the context of contemporary educational debates. Advocates for school choice have argued that both religious and private schools attend to the values of equality and civic participation while allowing for diversity in values, religious views and educational approaches. The authors of this paper, however, suggest that the ethos or constitutional vision of the common school is at odds with expanding programs that support private and religious school choice.

This paper interrogates the ways in which different meanings of equality and inequality are produced within political and legal discourses. With particular regard to the Australian experience, the paper considers the significance of the disappearance of affirmative action (AA) from the equality lexicon with the repeal of the federal AA legislation and its replacement with the equal opportunity (EO) for women in the workplace legislation. Even as this change was being implemented, EO was already being superseded in favor of ‘diversity’. It is argued that the linguistic changes signal a shift to the right of the political spectrum which emit deeply conservative and regressive messages regarding the gendered character of the workplace. Illustrations are drawn from the dissonant relationship between women and authority.