It is notable that in more than thirty years of anti-discrimination legislation in Australia, the High Court has heard only three cases dealing with sex discrimination. Even in the case of appeals to State appellate courts, complainants are rarely successful. Drawing on Robert Cover's idea of the nomos, or normative universe, which informs modes of adjudication, this paper will consider the role of appellate courts in the production of conventionally gendered subjects. It will be argued that a homologous relationship exists between juridical, legislative and corporate power which is cemented through the techniques of legal formalism.

This paper examines the ambiguous relationship between feminism and the state through the lens of sex discrimination legislation. Particular attention will be paid to the changing nature of the state as manifested by its political trajectory from social liberalism to neoliberalism over the last few decades. As a creature of social liberalism, the passage of sex discrimination legislation was animated by notions of collective good and redistributive justice, but now that neoliberalism is in the ascendancy, we see a resiling from these values in favour of private good and promotion of the self through the market. This cluster of values associated with neoliberalism not only serves to reify the socially dominant strands of masculinity, it also goes hand-in-glove with neoconservatism, which is intent on restricting the inchoate freedoms of women. The erosion of social liberal measures has caused many feminists to feel more kindly disposed towards the liberal state. Some attempt to unravel the contradictions relating to feminism and the state with particular regard to the key discourses of equality of opportunity.

This chapter appears in a collection honouring Sir Ninian Stephen, former Australian High Court Judge and Governor General. The chapter examines Sir Ninian's contributions to citizenship law in both a domestic and international context. Indeed, the chapter straddles both aspects of this book's division: Sir Ninian's domestic and international contributions. It begins by concentrating upon his Australian contributions in this field and then moves on to reflect in particular on his judgment in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Proscecutor v Dusko Tadic, which had important statements about nationality in an international humanitarian law context. As I too am interested in both jurisdictions, the chapter reflects upon the contrasts and similarities of Sir Ninian's contribution to those different jurisdictions and what they may tell us about Sir Ninian's framework for thinking about citizenship. In doing so, it is my contention that Sir Ninian is a role model to all seeking to be cosmopolitan citizens in an ever increasingly connected world.

This essay will explore the effect of developments in class action law and practice upon remedial law, and investigate the state of health of the compensation principle.

The compensation principle requires that plaintiffs should as nearly as possible be awarded a sum of money that will place them in the same position as if they had not suffered a wrong. The principle has occupied a central position in modern private law to provide standing to plaintiffs and to limit the powers of courts. Yet commentators such as Berryman argue that the compensation principle is in decline and suffering a death by a thousand cuts. Some of the deepest cuts have been inflicted by the modern class action.

This argument will be examined by reference to class actions in Australia, Canada, and the US, using the vitamins antitrust litigation in those jurisdictions as a case study.

The overall hypothesis is that whilst the compensatory principle is being assailed by the calls for the class action to deter corporate misconduct, the principle still acts as a moral compass. Corrective justice has not entirely yielded to instrumentalism, but the current autonomous, individualistic, and substantive law model of corrective justice under private law needs to adjust to group procedural justice as practised in law firms and in the courts.

This valedictory address presents an account of an experiment to set up a Department of Law and Legal Studies within a School of Social Sciences, at La Trobe University in Melbourne, with the aim of emphasising not just the role of law in its social context, but an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law. As with the attempts by the legal realists at Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s, the experiment was unsuccessful. In light of the evanescence of the vision, the question arose as to whether external political pressures, including the corporatisation of universities and the commodification of higher education, were responsible for inducing significant changes of direction or whether law is inherently resistant to the social.

Nationality has been central to law's understanding of membership. Moreover, the formal legal relationship between the individual and the state is that of citizenship - or nationality. However, as this chapter argues, various forces in the international context, including globalisation and the contrasting phenomena of fragmentation, express tensions besetting traditional notions of state membership in an international framework.

This chapter begins by looking at some of the issues underpinning the larger question of the role of nationality in humanitarian law. It then explores those questions in the context of the former Yugoslavia and in particular through the judgment of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of Tadic. It argues that nationality should not necessarily be a determinative factor when applying humanitarian law.

This article is from a paper given at a conference in 2000 which sought to do two things. First it draws out some of the legal issues central to citizenship and displays how they relate to the other disciplines in the development of citizenship in Australia. It argues there has not been a clear legal framework within which to develop an understanding of citizenship in Australia. Secondly, it argues that Chinese immigration to Australia in the second half of the 19th century was central to the evolution of citizenship in this country. Moreover, this factor has influenced the development of a legal framework that is confused, ambiguous, and contradictory about citizenship.

A major change in Australian citizenship law occurred on 4 April 2002. On that day, the governor-general of Australia assented to the passage of the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 2002 (Cth). Before that date, Australian citizens who took up a new citizenship (like Rupert Murdoch taking up US citizenship) automatically lost their Australian citizenship. Central to the former provision, and the 2002 changes, is a view of loyalty and allegiance to the nation-state. This chapter examines how those concepts of loyalty and allegiance are central to discussions on citizenship, and how they are reflected in Australian citizenship law. Moreover, it argues that the change on dual citizenship in Australia has constitutional ramifications; for example, section 44 of the Constitution prevents dual citizens from running for parliament. The chapter concludes with the proposal that the Constitution needs amendment to reflect modern notions of commitment over outdated notions of sole allegiance to one country.

How well are the legal concepts of citizenship and nationality travelling in a globalised world? This chapter addresses the effects of globalization on people's status and membership within their own territory, and beyond it. Citizenship is a legal, political, and social construct that has domestic and international consequences. I argue that citizenship, in its traditional meaning of participation in and membership of the nation-state, will be fundamentally altered by globalisation and will not continue to travel in the same manner that it has been. The familiar domestic and international consequences of citizenship, such as political voting rights, legal rights, including the right to leave and enter a country, and social welfare rights, will be fundamentally affected by the changes in people's connection to the nation-state. This means that it can't be recognised as a generalisable legal notion, to the extent that it may have been in the past. Moreover, as people identify and become members of more than one community, we will witness an acceptance of multi-citizenship/membership within the nation-state and within the international order. The rise of the world citizen and the changes that have occurred in the nation-state mean that citizenship and nationality will be revised concepts in the 21st century. If they are able to adapt to these changed frameworks, then citizenship and nationally may continue to travel well. This chapter is a combination of two earlier works of the author reproduced in this important book edited by Catherine Dauvergne.