Using Ohio's experience with court-ordered mediation in school finance litigation as a point of departure, this article examines the potential for court-ordered mediation to provide procedural justice in the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. The article begins by sketching out some of the difficulties that courts encounter when designing a remedy in a school finance case and some of the reasons why, at least in the abstract, a mediation process may assist the parties and the court. Next, the article provides a brief history of the DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E. 2d 1113 (Ohio 2001), placing the abstract remedial concepts against the concrete details of a particular case. It then explores some possible reasons for the failure of the DeRolph mediation and suggests what might have been done to create a better possibility for success.

In spite of the failure of the DeRolph mediation, this article suggests that mediation may play a productive role in the future of school finance cases. Court-ordered mediation may permit the re-structuring of the remedial process in a way that addresses minority rights which often are lost or minimized in the traditional legislative process. Further, a participatory mediation process holds promise for achieving remedial results in a school finance case that are both educationally viable and politically sustainable. Mediation may open new avenues for the resolution of litigation at the intersection of private process and public policy.

Several lessons may be drawn from the DeRolph litigation. DeRolph teaches that mediation is more likely to play a positive role in the resolution of an important institutional reform case if it is considered as a primary avenue of achieving remedial results rather than as a very last resort. Further, any court considering whether to order the mediation of an important institutional reform case should be attentive to creating a substantive and procedural framework that will support the parties' motivation and effort to devise their own remedy. This article encourages the court to support court-ordered mediation by providing a clear and unequivocal statement of the rights of the parties and remedial principles that apply in the case and by outlining fall-back remedial procedures that will be implemented if resolution is not achieved. The court should also consider the legitimacy benefit that may accrue from the participation of a broad group of interested constituencies and construct a framework that supports the mediator's efforts to identify and include a broad group of stakeholders.

This article represents an effort to learn from past failure and to plan for future success in school finance mediation and other public law litigation.

This paper turns to historical evidence as a beginning point for understanding the constitutional vision and values of the "thorough and efficient system of common schools" mandated by Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. First, it traces the early development of public schooling in America and the complex relationship between public education and religion. The common school, as envisioned by the Ohio crusaders for its establishment, would bring diverse peoples together to create a common sense of citizenship. It would provide for citizen equality, and social and economic mobility; and it would safeguard liberty by developing a polity capable of self-government. The common school vision competed, however, with the existing reality of schools that were tuition-based, locally governed, diverse and sectarian.

Prior to 1851, the conflict over competing visions of schooling - one embraced primarily by protestant school crusaders, the other embraced by the Catholic Church - had escalated into violent conflict in New York City and Boston. In Ohio, conflict relating to the nature of public education, and, more specifically, the use of public money for sectarian schools had not become violent, but had been vigorously debated since 1789. The inclusion of the provision for a "thorough and efficient system of common schools" in the Constitution of 1851 represented a victory for the advocates of a non-sectarian, state-operated system of schools that would encourage civic participation and avoid religious indoctrination.

Next, the paper addresses efforts made to revise the state's educational provisions through constitutional amendments in 1874 and again in 1912. In considering and rejecting various amendments to Article VI, Section 2, the delegates to these conventions reinforced and redefined the non-sectarian ethos of public education. They also added new provisions to centralize authority for the efficient administration of education and to ensure state oversight over a single system of schools.

Finally, the authors attempt to place the constitutional "common school ideal" in the context of contemporary educational debates. Advocates for school choice have argued that both religious and private schools attend to the values of equality and civic participation while allowing for diversity in values, religious views and educational approaches. The authors of this paper, however, suggest that the ethos or constitutional vision of the common school is at odds with expanding programs that support private and religious school choice.

Australian Citizenship Law in Context by Kim Rubenstein is a new book published in May 2002 by Lawbook Company. Citizenship is the pivotal legal status in any nation-state. For Australia, the democratic, social and political framework, and its identity as a nation, is shaped by the notion of citizenship. Australian Citizenship Law in Context sheds light on citizenship law and practice in the broader context. It also provides the most up-to-date analysis available of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 and its future direction, plus the first comprehensive listing and analysis of legislation that discriminates upon the basis of citizenship and residence.

The book covers issues of citizenship law, migration law and constitutional and administrative law, and is also a valuable resource for any discipline interested in citizenship. Contents. Preface. Table of Contents. Table of Cases. Table of Statutes. Chapter 1: Citizenship in Australia: An overview. Chapter 2: Australian Citizenship in the 1890s and the Australasian Federal Convention Debates. Chapter 3: Australian "Subjecthood" before Australian Citizenship 1901-1949. Chapter 4: The Australian Citizenship Act 1948. Chapter 5: The Legislative Consequences of Citizenship. Chapter 6: The High Court and Citizenship and Membership. Chapter 7: The Future of Australian Citizenship Law. Index

This article looks at citizenship as both a legal formal notion, and as a normative notion. While the legal citizen is primarily concerned with the formal status of individuals in the community (compared to permanent and temporary residents), the normative citizen looks to broader concepts, speaking of membership regardless of a person's formal status. The consequence of these different meanings is that citizenship has been expressed in both inclusive and exclusive ways throughout the 20th century. The article displays this by looking at the beginnings of citizenship in Australia before the legal status was formalised, then the first fifty years of the formal status, and finally at the legislative and common law expressions of citizenship. It argues that the confused and often contradictory messages of citizenship require us to be more mindful in the 21st century about the relationship between the formal and normative meanings of the term.

This paper surveys legal research in Australia. Using both theoretical and empirical work, it argues for a significant shift towards humanistic, theoretical, and interdisciplinary scholarship in law and explores the implications for legal research and for postgraduate supervision of this shift.

This paper interrogates the ways in which different meanings of equality and inequality are produced within political and legal discourses. With particular regard to the Australian experience, the paper considers the significance of the disappearance of affirmative action (AA) from the equality lexicon with the repeal of the federal AA legislation and its replacement with the equal opportunity (EO) for women in the workplace legislation. Even as this change was being implemented, EO was already being superseded in favor of ‘diversity’. It is argued that the linguistic changes signal a shift to the right of the political spectrum which emit deeply conservative and regressive messages regarding the gendered character of the workplace. Illustrations are drawn from the dissonant relationship between women and authority.

This article argues that mandatory sentences are unconstitutional under Australian law. The constitutional challenge most likely to succeed is not based on the practical severity or otherwise of the law, but instead based on an argument of incompatibility with the judicial process. This is an argument which has only been clarified since the High Court’s decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), itself decided long after Palling. The real issue is not the existence of prosecutorial discretion but the striking absence of any countervailing judicial discretion. This balancing discretion is central to the idea of judicial process as we understand it. In the normal course of events, if a prosecutor decides to use his or her discretion to pursue an essentially trivial matter, the Court may refuse to impose a fine, or suspend the sentence, or discharge the matter. Undoubtedly there are limits to these powers in some legislation, but these limits do not completely eliminate judicial discretion although they may constrain it. More specifically, we argue that mandatory sentencing provisions require courts to act in a way which is incompatible with the obligation to act judicially. We examine the evolution of what we call the ‘doctrine of incompatibility’ in an effort to give more concrete meaning to the idea of acting in accordance with the judicial process. Our purpose in this article is not to comprehensively define what constitutes the judicial process. Rather, we argue that the judicial process at least requires that those who preside over the process act judicially, and we seek to explore what it means to act judicially. We contend that the act of judgment must have integrity and independence, secured at the very least by procedural fairness, and arguably, by equal justice. Moreover, the act of judgment must involve some degree of independent judicial discretion in determining sentence. Some element of genuine judicial discretion is necessary in legitimating the judicial role, and thus in maintaining public confidence in the courts. The history of the English, and later the Australian common law cannot be read as suggesting that the legislature enjoys unlimited power to completely eliminate judicial discretion in imposition of punishment.

This essay introduces an interdisciplinary symposium held at Cardozo School of Law in New York, and argues for a new field of study on the relationship between music and legla theory - historical, social, semiotic, symbolic, and theoretical. The symposium gathered leading figures from fields of legal theory, social theory, and musicology to present their work.

This essay presents a joint history of music and society in relation to legal change particularly in the law of evidence, around 1750. the paper argues that the dramatic changes in both fields reflected similar social transformations which together changed their normative structure and assumptions, their relationship to text, interpretation, and authenticity, and their affective, instrumental, and normative ambitions. The history of music and the history of law are imbricated and entwined. Mozart's Requiem and the law on Dying Declarations are both transitional moments in the birth of formalist in law and music alike; both reflect changing and powerful ideas about text, meaning, interpretation, and, ultimately, about death.