GREENING CITIZENSHIP, AFTER DUALISM

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1.1 Introduction

For several decades, sustainable development (SD) has been regarded as a political problem that requires reconciling policy with a concept, 'environmental sustainability'. That is, achieving SD implies competing normative premises and evaluative standards, and "various formulations, identifying different root causes of environmental problems and prescribing different remedies" (Vanderheiden, 2008: 435). These extend from demands for "simple adjustment of policy tools (which may uncritically accommodate deeper contradictions in the broader policy environment) to an innovative transformation of policy direction" that requires institutional reflexivity prompted by political critique (Eckersley, 2004: 80). That is, SD tends to be 'forced' upon states by actors in the political sphere while it is also a state project of "securing a social development trajectory that remains within the frontiers of environmental sustainability" (Meadowcroft, 2005: 4). Beginning in the 1990s, demands for the 'greening' of citizenship were seen to be affecting the state and global society in this direction. A nascent green citizenship was regarded as the product of growing cultural support for a *holistic* view of citizens and the state as participating in nature, over long-prevalent *dualistic* self-understandings of citizens and the state as completely subjecting nature (Turner, 1997: 16; 2001: 194; van Steenbergen, 1994: 147). Since then, debates over green citizenship have been central to the promotion of SD (Christoff, 2005; Meadowcroft, 2005).

This paper addresses the links between SD and green citizenship. It presents a different version of the argument developed at length in my forthcoming research monograph, *Citizenship and the 'greening' of the state*. First focussing on some of the key political problematics that are identified in theories of green citizenship, I then briefly examine contemporary social conditions. In particular, I find that aspects of postindustrialization, individualization and the 'shift from government to governance' support holistic social relations, dissolve boundaries between the private and public spheres and are non-contractual and non-territorial. Such conditions resolve some of the problematics that are central to green citizenship's political critique. In particular, I find that the hold of nature/culture dualism has given way to a form of holism that supports representations of society as a participant in nature, rather than subjecting it. Other aspects of green citizenship's political critique are recognizable in the corporate social and environmental responsibility movement, green consumerism and local-global governance, which have little or indeed negative impacts upon efforts to establish SD. In this sense, my argument follows recent work by Axel Honneth (2004), Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) and Nancy Fraser, who asks on what terms have aspirations that once had a clear emancipatory thrust come to assume a far more ambiguous meaning in the 21st century (2009a: 108).

1.2 Green Citizenship as Critique

Key empirical reference points for interest in green citizenship were the post1989 wavering of cultural concern with issues such as class and the decline of 'old' social movements organized around them and an upsurge of concern with the relationship between society and the environment, and with subpolitical 'new' social movement concerns with the impacts of globalization on local and individual wellbeing (Turner, 2001; van Steenbergen, 1994). By 2005, it was said that, "There seems to be a consensus among analysts of this turn to citizenship, that the very enlisting of the idea

implies a recognition that SD requires shifts in attitudes at a deep level", and that green citizenship "opens up and offers the possibility of checking self-interest against the common good in systematic ways, because this is part of what citizenship—as concept and practice—is about" (Dobson & Valencia Sáiz, 2005: 157).

On the one hand, environmental liberal rights-based citizenship extends claims about civil, political and social rights to encompass *environmental* rights. Liberal green citizenship extends the definition of who is covered by such rights: if pollution is global, then it follows that citizenship should be thought about and acted on in global terms. It is argued that for liberal citizenship to become green, classical notions of negative liberty, (state) neutrality and anthropocentric bias can logically be limited without undermining the central notion of freedom, even though it does have the inevitable result that negative liberty can no longer be seen as the supreme criterion of a good society (Wissenburg, 2006: 31). This greening of traditional liberalism is to be achieved through recourse to acceptance of biophysical ecological limits to neutrality and an ecological expansion of liberal state or poststate polity neutrality to encompass "non-human and non-present human interests and the means for accounting for the formation of individual preferences" (31). Liberal green citizenship would necessitate an abandonment of classical liberal 'disembodied' citizenship because it is incompatible with the right to have our basic needs met and the fact of 'reasonable pluralism' (Bell, 2005: 183), as these must be understood in the context of humanity's desecration of the Earth's capacity to provide for it. On the other hand, ecological, civic-republican duties-based citizenship seeks to cultivate citizenly virtues and 'ecological' identity, behaviour, values and, so, practices. Green citizenship in this aspect is promoted by political engagement and activism aimed at improving ecological awareness, scientific knowledge of climate change, self-reliance, self-restraint, self-responsibility and consideration of non-human interests. The tendency in debates over green citizenship to privilege liberal and, so, 'contractual' conceptions of rights over civic-republican conceptions of active, critical and responsible green citizenship is seen as a problem (Barry, 2006: 23). A more ambitious civic-republican conception of green citizenship, grounded by the task of "connecting solidarity, commitment and democracy to citizenship" would challenge not merely the environmental effects of unsustainable development but its cultural, political and economic injustices (24). Such citizenship is committed not merely to achieving environmental justice but at the same time to achieving social justice by, amongst other things, promoting active citizen participation in political decision-making. That is, the obligation to participate is oriented directly towards achieving SD. This said, along with Tim Hayward, I feel it more productive to treat these as different dimensions of the concept and view environmental liberal rights-based and ecological civic-republican responsibilities-based conceptions as sharing the same 'architecture' (2006: 441).

The political critique of green citizenship can be described in terms of debates around five key problematics: the challenge to nature/culture dualism and to redefine justice in terms of human existence within the ecosphere, the need to eschew the public/private split and to implement local/global non-territorialism and non-contractualism. The challenge to nature/culture dualism is central, insofar as "few concepts are as deeply embedded in the dualisms of Western political thought as that of citizenship" (Gabrielson & Paredy, 2010: 374). To clarify, dualism is "the epistemological construal of modern thought [that] creates a disengaged subject 'free and rational to the extent that he [*sic*] has fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds' so much so that 'the subject withdraws from his own body, which he is able to look on as an object'" (Taylor, 1995: 7). The task of green citizens is to disrupt a set of binary oppositions that are central to citizenship: these are between public and private, active and passive, rights and duties, and territorialized and de-territorialized space (Dobson 1999: 40) and introduce epistemological holism (Barry, 2006; Gabrielson & Paredy, 2010). The task of redefining 'justice' is implicitly and explicitly central to establishing a new conception of citizenship. Justice for green citizens is defined in relation to human existence within the ecosphere. Existing citizenship rights and duties, the culture of citizenship and the state itself should be recast in terms of the exploitation of a 'fair

share' of the planetary the Ecological Footprint (Dobson, 2003: 99). Environmental rights are rights to a fair share of the global Ecological Footprint, and ecological obligations are to use only one's fair share of it. This is a point that I am not contesting. While accepting the view that contemporary norms ground justice in something like the shared and limited nature of the global Ecological Footprint or, more than likely, some ambiguous notion of 'sustainability' as a virtue (Connelly, 2006), I rather problematize the means for achieving justice through green citizenship as it is currently theorized by generalizing from observed social relations.

Efforts to eschew the private/public split begin from an assertion that action in the private sphere, such as purchasing goods and services, riding a bicycle or recycling, insofar as they are aimed at minimizing one's Ecological Footprint, are political acts. Or, that consumption can be a site for citizenship practice and ethico-moral formation that leads to deeper political engagement. In either case, private virtues are conceived such that the division between private and public spheres is rejected (Barry, 2006; Dobson, 1999). By contrast, again following Hayward, my concern is that moral obligations do not automatically translate into political obligations, from which it follows that a moral community of private individuals does not automatically create a political community (Hayward, 2006: 438). What is required for translating moral into political obligations is action on political institutions: legitimation by citizens of the authority that organizes the rules for life held in common and orients these rules towards SD is seen as a necessity. A linked debate is that associated with the task of implementing local/global non-territorialism and non-contractualism. Green citizenship is said to be cosmopolitan or postcosmopolitan, insofar as it grounds a political community that transcends the nation-state and centres on a global 'green' society. Based on the cosmopolitan assertion that individuals' rights and responsibilities should be central to politics, green citizenship moves to act locally in response to global issues. Green citizens are responsible for "ecological stewardship", for acting on the basis of knowledge of and democratic input into managing the metabolism of nature in society (Barry, 2006). It overflows the boundaries of the nation-state (Christoff, 1996; Jelin, 2000), such that local community participation and a deliberative and consensus-driven politics represent the best institutional arrangements for SD (Arias-Maldonaldo, 2009). The achievement of non-contractual political relations is also seen as important, even though some more or less liberal rights-based conceptions see a 'green new deal' as essential to ensuring environmental rights, others advocate a politics that is beyond contractualism and encompasses non-contractual relations, grounded in non-reciprocal, asymmetrical obligations to uphold justice (Dobson, 2003: 47). The demand for non-contractualism draws almost exclusively upon the civic-republican ideal, which views all citizens as active participants in politics (Barry & Smith, 2008; Paehlke, 1989; Petit, 1997), from which it follows that a 'social contract' is unnecessary because citizens are self-responsible contributors to the task of authorizing the rules for life in common.

1.3 For Another Time?

With these problematics in mind, I suggest that green citizenship contains an implicit political critique that expresses new social movement and 'counter-cultural' concerns of the 1960s and 1970s. In short, four of the five problematics—challenging nature/culture dualism, eschewing the public/private split, implementing local/global non-territorialism and non-contractualism—represent political critique *for another time*. These problematics address an industrial, Fordist and relatively state-organized, that is, to some degree corporatist or at least Keynesian pluralist society; an economy centred on 'full-time' waged employment in large-scale, often heavy industry; the mass-consumption of mass-produced goods and services, including a unidirectional mass-media; a cultural realm that privileges 'fitting-in' with class and status group expectations; an entrenched, large-scale 'top-down', technocratic and bureaucratic government; internal politics shaped by tensions between different factions vying for the spoils of industrial production through some form of welfare state 'compromise', and external politics shaped by the Cold War. By contrast, I argue

that green citizenship in the early 21st century actually confronts a postindustrial, postFordist, disorganized and networked global society. Further, this situation is reconstituting the terms upon which injustice may be challenged. To maintain brevity, I concentrate here on three well-researched characteristics of contemporary social relations: postindustrialization, individualization and the 'shift from government to governance'. As a concept 'postindustrialization' points to the normalizing of service, information-intensive knowledge and creative industries requiring an expanded higher education sector and relatively well-educated and articulate, technical, professional and skilled workforce (Bell, 1978: 200). It also refers to the competitive de-regulation of industry, dismantling of bureaucracy and regulation in favour of outsourcing, downsizing, self-regulation and privatization of an unskilled and underemployed underclass:

The model of wage labour that held sway during the industrial era—in which a worker abdicated a degree of freedom in exchange for a certain amount of security—is no longer applicable today. The question today involves not simply the codification of the individual worker's rights but rather the creation of professional conditions for people such that, over the long term, their capabilities and economic needs are sufficiently assured to allow them to take initiatives and shoulder responsibilities. The key terms … are not jobs, subordination, and social security, but work (understood in all its forms, not just as wage labour), professional skills and economic security (Supiot, 2006: 109).

Importantly, this transformation shifts the emphasis on work away from an activity undertaken to meet instrumental needs and towards one where occupations at all levels are cast as universal "means to self-responsibility and hence self-optimization" (du Gay, 1996: 68). In the wake of neoliberal workplace reforms, a 'new wave' of management practice now invites managers, salaried staff, waged employees, contractors and suppliers to join corporations and privatized state enterprises as stakeholders *In Search of Excellence*, while congratulating end-users and consumers for choosing to support *Best Practice* and corporate social and environmental responsibility (182-183). A new era has emerged, where stakeholder negotiations aimed at achieving a holistic shared purpose displaces class-based industrial antagonism (Hill & Stephens, 2003; Juniper & Moore, 2002). This 'new world of work' blurs divisions between private and occupational life in ways that favour business interests over those of citizens *per se* (Hochschild, 1997), while undermining institutional resources for defending occupational justice. At issue is that hitherto countercultural demands for individual flexibility, autonomy, creativity and authenticity, in coinciding with state abandonment of the welfare state, have fostered an atomistic workplace culture and an inconstant and precarious way of life, where demands for "emotional labour" proliferate alongside an array of 'compassionate' service sector business models (Ehrenreich, 2006; Schor, 1991). Also important in this respect is that the major political parties and corporations that support such workplace reforms articulate the virtues of a particular kind of civil law actor-to-actor non-contractualism, one which relativizes the status of individuals in relation to the state and markets (Supiot, 2007). Successive Third Way and Big Society reforms call upon citizens who access social services to demonstrate willingness to deal directly with employers and state agencies (Glasman, 2010), undermining the liberal-democratic social contract (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Such non-contractualism is most visible in the 'downloading' of social services and implementing of 'workfare' regimes that began in the US and UK in the 1980s, in Australia, New Zealand and Canada in the 1990s and France, Germany and the EU generally into the 2000s (Alston, 2005; Freedland, 2003; Handler, 2000; Sainsbury, 2010). That is, once grounded by challenges to hierarchical relations, bureaucratic administration and conformist mannerism, the tendency to "reject … all forms of disciplinary regulation" in favour of personal liberty and autonomy has gradually been extended to "the support structures of capitalist enterprise itself" (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005: 419). More succinctly, the "individualism of self-realization has … been transmuted—having become an instrument of economic development … into an emotionally fossilized set of demands under whose consequences individuals today seem more likely to suffer than to prosper" (Honneth, 2004: 474).

Moreover, postindustrialization cannot be separated from individualization and awareness of 'risks' that confront the political imagination with unprecedented challenges (Beck, 2001; Isin, 2004; Mol & Spaargaren, 1993). Individualization erodes the "social-structural conditions for political consensus" that once made possible "collective political action", while sustaining a subpolitics that aims to address risk-issues from within a subject position that is at once 'egoistic' and 'altruistic' (Beck, 2001: 16). Said to be based on the defence of life as a personal project and the "rejection of its adversaries; a powerful market system on the one hand and a [conformist] communalism that imposes purity and homogeneity on the other" (162), subpolitics can be understood as a historical product of countercultural movements, such as the sexual revolution and more diffuse self-help, lifestyle and New Age fads (Frank, 1997; Heath & Potter, 2004) *and* new social movement activism, including environmentalism, aimed at universalizing expectations that life should be meaningful and grounded in self-reflection rather than status-group expectations, as well as conducted in harmony with nature (Habermas, 1971: 121; 1987: 388). Subpolitics is the form taken by politics where "it no longer makes sense" to situate one's self according to the perceived collective viewpoint (Gauchet, 2000: 34) but does do so in relation to a private search for authenticity through self-discovery (Taylor, 1991). Where "the problem of choice is now solved increasingly by the individual, whose capacity to act is coming to rest more and more on a reflexive relationship between experience and cultural options" and less on collective action or knowledge (Delanty, 2000b: 161), individual judgement of the value of collective representations in terms of optimal self-affirmation (Gauchet, 1991: 7) emerges as the guide for state responses to maintaining political legitimacy: 'consumerism' in the broadest sense displaces 'welfarism'.

Motivated by calls for participation and self-organization to minimize the creation of new risks and manage existing ones (Beck, 2001: 162-3), the widely debated shift from 'government to governance' can also be seen as a condition of the normalizing of calls for subpolitics. Rather than diminishing states' steering capacity (Jordan, *et al.*, 2005: 477), governance diffuses decision-making capacity and responsibility for decisions and deals with local concerns about global issues. The shift to governance is a response by the state to concerns about the "irrationalities of advanced industrial society" (Torgerson, 2003: 125). Horizontal networks of relatively localized, collaborative and participatory stakeholder-oriented governance fill an "institutional void … that has eroded the self-evidence" of 'objective' institutions as the locus for politics, such that "policy is being made without the backing of a polity" (Hajer, 2003: 177). Such stakeholder-oriented governance is also part and parcel of the corporate social and environmental responsibility movement and ideals of triple-bottom-line capitalism (Elkington, 2001). This movement is the product of a synthesis between state engagement in "a process of restructuring … with a decisive effort at deregulation, privatization, and the dismantling of the social contract between capital and labour" and efforts to maximize shareholder value by engaging stakeholders in negotiations over the impact of business activity or state policy (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Stoney & Winstanley, 2001). This movement aims to unleash a nature-like tendency for high-technology, privatized services, consumption-centred markets and localized negotiations to engender unprecedented opportunities for personal imaginativeness and creativity and individual freedom of choice, which are expected to lead to community development, ecological reparations and increase democratic accountability (Benioff & Southwick, 2003; Hill & Stephens, 2003; Juniper & Moore, 2002). In fact, the major global voluntary codes, such as the United Nations' Global Compact or Global Reporting Initiative, refer explicitly to the failed dualism of industrial society (2008; 2008). That is, stakeholder-oriented governance and the corporate social and environmental responsibility movement that has merged syncretically with it are explicitly holistic, non-contractual, and extend non-territorial relations of production and consumption from the local to the global while avoiding the liberal-democratic state as the institution holding the legitimate authority to organize the rules for life held in common.

Indeed, by the 2000s, the prime cause of unsustainability was generally understood at an institutional level as a consequence of market-failure (Seyfang, 2007). In this perspective, citizens

not only express their creativity and authentic individuality by choosing to contribute to innovative businesses as workplace 'partners' or 'associates', or engaging in 'stakeholder negotiations' with responsible corporations, but also in choosing to consume green commodities and invest in green businesses. Enlightened citizens are self-responsible for 'acting locally while thinking globally', and are called upon assume self-responsibility for global problems by 'ethically' choosing to consume with green discrimination (Scerri, 2003: 66). Citizens are called upon to pro-actively participate in green consumerism as a way of engaging in 'democracy through the wallet', where choosing one commodity over another is likened to choosing politicians in an election (Rayner, *et al.*, 2002; Schudson, 2006). That is, the rewards of embracing personalized 'creative' consumption opportunities devolve to citizens based on green consumption choices, as if moral choices were always elaborated into political obligations directly; "*as if* solutions to socially created problems were always synonymous with expedience in the private realm of autonomous sovereign choice" (Scerri, 2009: 474). Put differently, green consumerism represents efforts to assuage citizen awareness of socio-ecological problems in situations where political pressure to take resolute action is indirect and diffuse or 'subpolitical'. The problem is that private moral obligations to reduce one's Ecological Footprint are readily enlisted in the campaigns of 'greenwashing' or 'astroturfing' businesses (Beder, 2000), for example, with little or indeed negative impacts upon efforts to establish SD (Wapner & Willoughby, 2005). Green consumerism provides self-responsible private individuals with de-territorialized opportunities to address the impacts of their own localized actions *as if* there were no legitimate authority charged with organizing the rules for life held in common. In so-called affluent societies, the ethical considerations that provide motives for moral choices appear as aesthetic gradations of quality in the realm of consumption. My point is that some of the key claims of green citizenship, crystallized in the heady days of the 1970s, have been incorporated into social reproduction and, as such, have in fact been partly and problematically realized into the 2000s. Of course it might be argued that these examples take place only at the level of representations. That is, the new holism, privatizing of politics and the advent of local-global non-territorialism and non-contractualism are merely evidence of a postecological or postpolitical 'simulation' of action (Blühdorn, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2007). However, I am less concerned with this kind of assertion than with the view that it is precisely because such actions take place at the level of representations, at the level of 'spin', that they are important (Boltanski, 2011: 24).

1.4 Injustice After Dualism

In short, aspirations that had a clear emancipatory thrust in industrial conditions assume a far more ambiguous meaning in postindustrial conditions (Fraser, 2009a: 108). In theoretical terms, "The price paid by critique for being listened to, at least in part, is to see some of the values it has mobilized to oppose the form taken by the accumulation process being placed at the service of accumulation in accordance with a process of cultural assimilation" (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005: 29). Citizens are in this view stakeholder citizens (Scerri, 2009), neither the self-interested social atoms of conservatism nor the agents of social solidarity championed by progressives in industrial conditions. Stakeholder citizens exercise "the ethical and human capital development of the self organized around the possession of stakes" (Prabhakar, 2003: 347) within a global, ecologically modernizing competition state (Drache & Getler, 1991; Eckersley, 2004). Stakeholder citizens are enlightened and autonomous individuals who engage rights to act subpolitically, through local communities in horizontal governance processes and via green consumerism, while assuming self-responsibility for society's for participation in nature. Importantly, by contrast with views that it is no longer possible to clearly delineate between conservative and progressive positions (Delanty, 1997, 2000a), stakeholder citizenship tends to reify the two. On the one hand, whereas conservatism had earlier sought to preserve established structures of privilege based in claims to be upholding tradition, particularism over universalism and essentialism over contingency (Hirschman, 1991), such indirectness is no longer necessary. In the context of stakeholder citizenship, appeals to

preserve existing structures of privilege are made directly on the basis of subjective freedom of choice to consume resources and social policy that will further 'unburden' individuals and communities. On the other hand, whereas progressivism had sought to universalize the possibility of freedom by equivalizing economic redistribution, the class solidarity that underpinned such claims is no longer available. Contemporary appeals to justice based in universal freedom are more complex, and require considering capabilities for human flourishing at the subjective level and support for equality of capacity at the societal level (Sen, 2009). That is, they combine what Fraser sees as the inseparable requirements for recognition, redistribution and representation (Fraser, 2009b).

Globalization has brought about in the West a postindustrial mode of social reproduction that is grounded in a holistic ideology. That is, nature/culture dualism has been largely dissimulated, but not on terms of greens choosing. In this view, assertions that dissolving dualism and the public-private split, and that non-contractualism and non-territorialism are necessarily oriented to SD are somewhat problematic. Where a holistic, private-public, non-territorial and non-contractual local-global frame of reference for politics has been established, it is very difficult but not impossible to talk politically about injustice. My point is not to argue that possibilities for political action aimed at justice are non-existent. Rather, I my interest is in how possibilities for recognizing injustice are being redefined and, how some movements are responding to the politics of holism in new terms. Most importantly, in a holistic frame all parties share "genuine commitment to sustainability" (ASB, 2011), such that no class or social fraction can be directly held accountable for unsustainable development. For example, a coal using utility company might be a socially and environmentally responsible 'triple-bottom line' participant in a localized stakeholder governance initiative, yet also be responsible for pollution. As a class, 'power generators' cannot be done away with in the same manner that many once wanted, justifiably or not, to eradicate the class 'employers'. Solving the SD problem requires that coal production changes or is phased-out. Similarly, employers that pay low wages might be responsible for exploitation, but solving the subpolitical problems of wellbeing, 'liveability', 'quality-of-life' and, indeed, social participation, inclusion or mobility requires more than economic redistribution from one class to another based in claims about fairness or desert (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005: 354). Conversely, a demonstrably exploitative firm such as WalMart in the US can represent itself as a standard-bearer for business 'eco-friendliness'. Moreover, these problems benefit no-one that can be held directly responsible for creating them. No-one class or group benefits from things like social exclusion, lack of wellbeing or un-liveability in the same ways that 'the bosses' did from the exploitation of 'the workers'. While employers bear a responsibility for employees as a class, and coal using utility companies for carbon emissions, the class 'employers' or 'power generators' cannot be held directly or solely responsible as perpetrators of unsustainable development: exclusion, low mobility and 'lifestyle' problems such as low creativity, innovation or inauthenticity, as well as climate change and resource overuse, are *diffuse* whole-of-society problems, the by-products of unsustainable development that lack an identifiable class of *perpetrators*. In this situation, claiming that such a business undermines opportunities for SD appears churlish and uncompromising, and is readily excluded from debate as expressing marginal extremist concerns (Scerri, 2009). Similarly, if a social citizen is unable to find a job, it is possible to see this as a consequence of high unemployment. However, if a stakeholder citizen does not have an income, it is because one is not self-responsible and attentive to all of the dimensions of wellbeing, such as being creative and innovative, unmotivated and not pro-active in pursuit of personal excellence. Individuals themselves are held responsible for failing to take advantage of opportunities to participate, be well, or consume with green discrimination (Bauman, 2007; Honneth, 2004; Sennett, 2005), while private choices are elevated beyond their actual impact upon socio-ecological conditions (Wapner & Willoughby, 2005).

1.5 Conclusion: Responding to Injustice After Dualism

At issue is a need elucidate the contours of a critique of unsustainable development *after dualism*. It might be said that what is needed in this situation is a Green New Deal replicating the industrial welfare state compromise (Pettifor, 2008). However, such claims ignore the key condition for that compromise: it was based in an ever-expanding postcolonial economy (Dobson & Hayes, 2008). What is also neglected in such claims is that there is no single social movement with sufficient political power to push things in this direction, as the workers' movement could. Moreover, global production-information-consumption chains, techno-financial capitalism and, of course, climate change itself create complex inter-dependencies that blur territorial, cultural and economic borders.

I now turn to reflect on contemporary social movements as responding to the forms that injustice takes in the early 21st century West in its own terms. The well-known environmental justice movement (EJM) supplies a vocabulary for political opportunity action and a justice principle: that no public action on SD should disproportionately disadvantage any particular social group (Agyeman & Evans, 2006: 201). Opposed to a narrow focus on the environment that underplays the social and political dimensions implicit in SD, the EJM expands the remit of environmental politics to encompass human-to-human relations within the ecosphere. The movement shifts the focus of activism from narrow concerns with the distribution of environmental goods to a broad political concern to legitimate claims for recognition, capabilites and participation, drawing inspiration from an awareness that "there is a relationship between everyday experience of disrepect, disempowerment, economic debilitation, and the decimation of individual and community capabilites and … social movements such as civil rights, indigenous rights, gay and lesbian rights, feminism, poscolonialism and the more general movements for multicultural acceptance" (Schlosberg, 2007: 39). In this view, "environment, economy, and social justice issues are 'mutually constitutive" (Agyeman & Evans, 2006: 190). The EJM challenges stakeholder citizenship on its own holistic terms by demanding that rights to wellbeing and duties to be self-responsible are extended to all citizens. While stakeholder citizenship levels differences in capabilities by conflating winners with losers in a greening state, the EJM seeks to institutionalize a notion of wellbeing that goes beyond consumption-oriented 'choice' and self-responsibility to 'insure' against risk. Further, the EJM addresses the state as the legitimate authority charged with the task of organizing the rules for life held in common in a particular place. Hence, the EJM does not return to notions of class warfare, even though some may couch their actions in these terms. The EJM addresses the perpetrator problem not primarily by challenging exploiters of humans or 'nature', but by challenging malfeasants for undermining the wellbeing of (poisoned workers or neighbourhood) citizens or for exposing them to risks that are directly related to 'the environment' in a particular place. Claims for environmental rights of a specific kind in a particular place and covering a distinct group of persons are geared towards the state acting in this capacity, even when appealing to global norms or demanding international action.

The movement for financial transactions taxation (FTT) also challenges the holistic framing of unsustainable development. In the context of an emergent system of "global climate capitalism" that is "creating markets, where money can be made for trading carbon allowances … [and a]gainst the backdrop of recalcitrant industries and reluctant consumers", the movement potentially identifies "economic winners from decarbonisation" (Newell & Paterson, 2010: 10) and urges them to pay in support of 'losers'. The FTT enacts a truly "cosmopolitan global ethic" by creating political obligations upon "better-off people everywhere" (Harris, 2010: 137). The FTT operationalizes an "environmental harm convention" (EHC):

While not all of humankind contributes to environmental injustice, all of humankind does contribute in some way to environmental degradation, even if some do so disproportionately less than others. Some obligations, such as those to assist and compensate, may be unilateral but the commitment to a global environmental no harm principle — that is not to cause damage to the environment — must be universal (Elliott, 2006: 357).

This implies a demand that 'winners' contribute, differentially and in direct proportion to 'losers', to support socio-economic fairness in relation to climate change reparations. That is, linking FTT

with the EHC maintains the holistic frame. It creates a political obligation that applies universally but differentially. Enacting the EHC through FTT would create political obligations and political community, insofar as winners and losers are identified and allotted a status within a holistic frame. The beneficiaries of global financial markets, including those benefitting from pension plans or sovereign wealth funds in rich states or poor, would be obligated to provide restitution while those who do not benefit—who in some sense still ‘contribute’ to environmental harm—would not. Such a facility would undercut the “advantaged citizen-[rich] state myopia and extend [cosmopolitan] arguments to their logical conclusion: *all* advantaged persons, regardless of whether they live in a [rich] state or a poor one, harm the world’s poor” (Harris, 2010: 139). The FTT addresses the tendency towards constitutional excess and excessive administration, “at the very moment administrative and constitutionalized problem-solving seem to be yielding to networked governance at national, regional and local levels, liberal multilateralists [holding to unreconstructed cosmopolitan ideals] still seek to risk replicating these questionable models at the global level” (Dryzek, 2006: 144). It promotes a global regime that is formalized and administered from within green states. Although of course creating its own political and administrative difficulties, it is not unreasonable to imagine an FTT avoiding constitutional excessiveness and administrative unwieldiness. A precedent for such action is set by the EU decision to impose a virtual ‘border adjustment tax’ on airlines arriving from nations without a carbon taxation levy (Kanter, 2010) or the recent announcements that an FTT of sorts is to be applied in response to the latest fiscal crisis in the EU (Wakim 2011).

The fair-trade movement (FTM) began in the 1970s with the aim of promoting justice in international trade in consumer goods. Since the 1990s, the FTM has increasingly shown signs of a split with the fair-trade network (FTN). While the movement has maintained agitation for increased regulation of trade, FTNs have by and large accommodated ‘neoliberalism’, arguing that fair-trade helps makes ‘free trade’ work for the poor’ (Fridell, 2010: 467). In light of this split, the FTM for increased regulation, led by groups such as the European Fair-Trade Association, the Fairtrade Labelling Organization and Oxfam International (2007), agitates for obligations to eschew “injustice by virtue of [individuals’] structural connectedness to it, even though [individuals] are not to *blame* for it” (Young, 2003: 40). When a distinction is drawn between the promotion of private moral choice by FTNs and efforts by the FTM to promote a political regulation, it becomes clear that while the former promote justice based on moral obligations, the latter promote justice based on political obligations. The FTM makes explicit the existence of hierarchy in the holistic frame of stakeholder citizenship, and the relativizing of private and public obligations. While consuming individuals act-out the existence of a hierarchy that is obscured at the level of private moral choice, the FTM acts ‘behind-the-scenes’, petitioning politically for that hierarchy to be recognized as a structural injustice. The FTM draws attention to the state as legitimate arbiter of the compromise on the social bond, and takes political action by rendering private subjective ‘acknowledgement’ effective as a contribution to debates over justice. Insofar as the FTM rejects green consumerism and seeks regulation and mandatory compliance schemes at the national scale and ‘fair’ over ‘free’ trade agreements at the international level, it highlights differences between indiscriminate globalization and just internationalization, the wholesale integration of global markets and just terms for interdependence. Indeed, the need for inter-nationalization and recognition of national or supra-national blocs of interdependence in global trade is recognized as a key requirement for SD in some strands of ecological economics (Daly, 2007: 52). The FTM addresses the dissolution of the private-public split not by calling for its reinstatement but by recognizing the moral obligation to assume responsibility for consumption choices, and seeking protection for it from the state and international community in the form of regulations for compliance with minimum standards.

Several other contemporary movements address injustice in holistic terms. These include the movement for a guaranteed basic income, which addresses the diffuse nature of work by calling for a social participation ‘wage’, and the movement to establish participatory social indicators of SD, which addresses the perpetrator issue by involving citizens in setting ‘scientific’ boundaries for

monitoring policy and practice. As I have argued, aspirations that once had a clear emancipatory thrust—such as for holism, eschewing the public-private split, for non-contractual social relations and local-global non-territorialism—seem far more ambiguous 21st century postindustrial conditions. The movements discussed here recognize a disjuncture between the holistic vision for SD that greens advocate, and the shortcomings of a political system that has over recent decades incorporated holism into its institutions, albeit on terms not of greens' choosing.

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